The decisions to reduce, leave unchanged, or increase (the price, rating, policy interest rate, etc.) are often characterized by abundant no-change outcomes that are generated by di¤erent processes. Moreover, the positive and negative responses can also be driven by distinct forces. To capture the heterogeneity of the data-generating process this paper develops a two-stage cross-nested model, combining three ordered probit equations. In the policy rate setting context, the …rst stage, a policy inclination decision, determines a latent policy stance (loose, neutral or tight), whereas the two latent amount decisions, conditional on a loose or tight stance, …ne-tune the rate at the second stage. The model allows for the possible correlation among the three latent decisions. This approach identi…es the driving factors and probabilities of three types of zeros: the "neutral"zeros, generated directly by a neutral policy stance, and two kinds of "o¤set" zeros, the "loose" and "tight" zeros, generated by a loose or tight stance, o¤set at the second stage. Monte Carlo experiments show good performance in small samples. Both the simulations and empirical applications to the panel data on individual policymakers' votes for the interest rate demonstrate the superiority with respect to the conventional and two-part models.
Introduction
Ordinal dependent variables, taking on negative, zero and positive values, are often characterized by the abundant and potentially heterogeneous observations in the middle (neutral or zero) category. For instance, most central banks adjust policy rates by discrete increments -namely multiples of 25 basis points -and no-change decisions commonly constitute an absolute majority (e.g., 63, 66, 76 and 79 percent in the US Federal Reserve, National Bank of Poland, Bank of England and European Central Bank, respectively) 1 . As Figure 1 shows, the policy rate of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) remained unchanged during three di¤erent circumstances: namely, during policy tightening; during maintaining (between the reversals); and during periods of easing. Many of "zeros" that are clustered between the reversals during the maintaining periods, are likely to be driven by di¤erent forces than many of those that are situated between the changes in the same direction during periods of policy tightening or easing.
To illustrate this, Table 1 reports the average values of macroeconomic indicators, observed separately only during policy decisions to either increase, reduce or leave the rate unchanged. In the no-change case, these values are reported separately for periods of policy tightening, maintaining and easing. The economic conditions, observed on average when the rates were not changed during the tightening/easing periods, are much closer to those, observed when the rates were increased/reduced, than to those that prevailed on average when the rates were maintained between the reversals. On the other hand, some of the no-change decisions during the maintaining periods occurred under the economic circumstances, similar to those observed during some decisions to hike or cut the rates. These stylized facts suggest that no-change decisions can be generated by di¤erent decision-making processes. In addition, the positive and negative changes may be also driven by distinct determinants. This de…nitely poses a problem for a standard discretechoice model such as the ordered probit (OP) or logit model. In such situations, it would be a misspeci…cation to disregard the heterogeneity of zeros, to treat all the observations as coming from the same data-generating process (d.g.p.) , and to apply a conventional model, based on a single equation. This paper develops a three-equation cross-nested ordered probit (CNOP) model for such types of ordinal outcomes, and illustrates the model in the context of policy interest rate decisions. Suppose that an ordinal dependent variable -for example, a discrete change to policy rate -can be in three latent regimes (loose, neutral or tight), where it can take on only nonpositive, zero or nonnegative values, respectively. The upper left panel of Figure 2 shows a decision tree. The …rst stage, a policy inclination decision, sets the regime, i.e. monetary policy stance. The inclination decision is driven by a direct reaction to the economic conditions, particularly to the developments since the last policy meeting. At the second stage, if the stance is neutral, no further policy actions are taken and the rate is maintained. If the stance is loose (tight), the policymakers can cut (hike) the rate by certain amount or may leave it unchanged. These two amount decisions, conditional on either loose or tight policy stances, …ne-tune the rate and are more of a tactical and institutional nature. The model allows for the possible correlation among the three latent decisions. Under this interpretation, we can classify three kinds of zeros and describe how they arise: the "always" or "neutral" zeros, generated directly by neutral policy reactions to economic conditions; and two kinds of "not-always" or "o¤set" zeros, the "loose" and "tight" zeros, generated by loose or tight policy regimes, o¤set by tactical and institutional reasons.
The existence of di¤erent types of no-change decisions is justi…ed by the very nature of monetary policymaking, which involves processing huge amounts of data, meeting di¤erent and sometimes con ‡icting goals, and which is often conducted by a committee composed of heterogeneous members, as well as by the discrete nature of the interest rate changes themselves. For example, despite a loose policy stance, the policymakers can maintain the rate due to the following reasons. First, the recent "policy bias" statement of the central bank, which indicates the most likely policy direction in the immediate future, was neutral or even tightening (this addresses the policymakers' concerns about the competence and credibility of the central bank's communication). Second, the dissenting policymakers at the last meeting preferred the higher rate, creating an upward pressure to the rate at the current meeting (this accounts for the fact that the monetary policy is commonly conducted by a committee, often composed of heterogeneous members) 2 . Third, the rate was already lowered at the last meeting (this re ‡ects the general reluctance to move the rate frequently). Fourth, the cumulative changes to the economic indicators since the date of the last nonzero policy rate adjustment do not suggest the policy easing (the policymakers, who face uncertainty about the economy and incur the costs in the case of the subsequent rate reversal, prefer to wait and to react to more accumulated economic information in order to minimize the risk of the reversals). Finally, the policy rate has already reached the lower zero bound. As we shall observe, the proposed three-equation models are fairly easy to estimate via maximum likelihood. The Monte Carlo results suggest good performance of the proposed cross-nested ordered probit (CNOP) models in the small samples and demonstrate its superiority with respect to the conventional OP model producing biased estimates if the d.g.p. is heterogeneous. The new models are applied to explain the policy interest rate decisions of the NBP, using a panel of the individual votes of the Monetary Policy Council (MPC) members and real-time macroeconomic data available at MPC meetings. The individual policy preferences of the policymakers appeared to be well-modelled by a new approach. The empirical application demonstrates the advantages of the new models in separating di¤erent decision-making paths for three types of zeros, identifying the determinants of policy decisions and estimating the marginal e¤ects of explanatory variables on the predicted probabilities.
The CNOP model is able to identify the driving factors of each decision and estimate the probabilities of the latent policy regimes and three types of zeros. As a practical matter, this allows certain variables to a¤ect the inclination and amount decisions di¤erently; hence, the probabilities of positive, negative and three types of zero outcomes may be driven by di¤erent sources. The model estimates how the decomposition of no-change decisions depends on the observed data, and sheds additional light on monetary policy inertia. Only about a quarter of observed zeros appeared to be generated by the neutral policy stance. This …nding suggests a high degree of gradualism and deliberate interest-rate smoothing in the decision-making process of the NBP. The conventional OP models, based on a single latent equation, are shown to confuse the marginal e¤ects of the explanatory variables that have an impact only on one decision or opposing impacts on both decisions. Besides, the marginal e¤ects of the explanatory variables reveal the non-monotonic relationships between these variables and choice probabilities. The standard OP models overlook such non-monotonic patterns.
The proposed CNOP model is related to three strands of econometric literature. On the one hand, it can be described as a two-level cross-nested ordered probit model, an extension of a two-level nested ordered probit (NOP) model with three nests (see upper right panel of Figure 2) . At the upper level of the NOP model the policymakers decide whether to increase, maintain, or decrease the rate. This trilemma is modelled by a trichotomous OP model. In case of a no-change decision, no further policy actions are taken, and the rate remains unchanged. If the policymakers decide to hike or to cut the rate, they have to choose the amount of the change. This …ne-tuning lower level, conditional on the decision to increase or decrease the rate at the upper level, is modeled by two distinct OP models. Overall, the NOP model combines three equations with, in general, di¤erent sets of covariates. Therefore, in contrast to a standard single-equation OP model, in the NOP model, one set of explanatory variables may be relevant for the rate cuts, while another set may be relevant for the hikes. The third set of covariates would a¤ect the no-change decisions. In the CNOP model the three nests overlap -they all contain the zero outcomes. It creates three distinct d.g.p's, generating zero observations. Notice also another key di¤erence between the NOP and CNOP models: in the former both levels'decisions are observable, whereas in the latter they are observed partially, only when the outcome is nonzero. In the CNOP model the outcomes in the in ‡ated zero category are observationally equivalent -we never know from which of the three regimes the zeros arise, whereas in the NOP model we always know to which of the three nests the observed outcomes belong. In this sense the three regimes in the CNOP model are latent.
In case of the unordered categorical data where the choices can be grouped into nests of similar options, the nested logit model is used widely. Several kinds of multinomial logit models with overlapping nests have been also proposed. Wen and Koppelman (2001) introduced a generalized nested logit model, which contains the other cross-nested logit models as special cases. The nested and cross-nested models, speci…cally designed for the ordered alternatives, are not used so widely 3 .
On the other hand, the CNOP model can be perceived as a three-part middle-categoryin ‡ated mixture model. The two-part mixture models, developed to deal with both the abundant zeros and unobserved heterogeneity, include the zero-in ‡ated Poisson (Lambert 1992) and negative binomial (Greene 1994 ) models for count outcomes, as well as the zeroin ‡ated ordered probit (ZIOP) model (Harris and Zhao 2007) and zero-in ‡ated proportional odds model (Kelley and Anderson 2008) for ordinal variables. These zero-in ‡ated models are the natural extensions of the two-part (or hurdle, or split-population) models, …rst proposed by Cragg (1971) for non-negative continuous data, and then developed for the count data (Mullahy 1986) , survival time data (Schmidt and Witte 1989) , and discrete ordered time-series data (the autoregressive conditional hazard (ACH) model of Hamilton and Jorda 2002) . A two-part model basically represents a two-level model with two nests. It combines a binary outcome model for the probability of crossing the hurdle (the upperlevel participation decision) with a truncated-at-zero model for the outcomes above the hurdle (the lower-level amount decision). The di¤erence between the two-part ACH and ZIOP models (see bottom panels of Figure 2 ) is that in the former the two parts are estimated separately, the zero observations are excluded from the second part, and, hence, the discrimination among di¤erent kinds of zeros is not accommodated, whereas in the latter the two nests overlap, assuming two types of zeros, and, hence, the probability of zeros is "in ‡ated". The ZIOP model is able to identify the di¤erent d.g.p's of two kinds of zeros 4 . Hamilton and Jorda (2002) applied the ACH model to the changes to the Federal funds rate target, made by the US Federal Open Market Committee; Brooks et al. (2012) applied the ZIOP model to the panel data on the changes to the policy rate, preferred by each member of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee.
The three-part CNOP model is a natural generalization of the two-part ZIOP model. A trichotomous participation decision (increase versus no change versus decrease) seems to be more realistic than a binary one (change versus no change) if applied to such types of ordinal data -the policymakers, who are willing to adjust the rate, have naturally already decided in which direction they want to move it. Combining these two distinct decisions at the upper hurdle into one category, as done in the ZIOP model, may seriously distort the inference. The same explanatory variable can have di¤erent weights in the decisions to increase or reduce the rate. Besides, the CNOP model allows the probabilities and magnitudes of the positive changes to the rate to be a¤ected by di¤erent determinants than those of the negative changes. The ZIOP model is more suitable if applied to explain such decisions as, for example, the levels of consumption, when the upper hurdle is naturally binary (to consume or not to consume).
Finally, the two-part model is similar by structure to a discrete version of the sample selection model 5 . However, in the sample selection model the …rst hurdle, the selection decision, determines whether the outcome variable is observed, rather than whether the activity is undertaken, as in the two-part model, where all the outcomes are actually observed. In many applications, in the absence of the sample selection problem, there is no need in modeling the latent potential, as opposed to the observed actual outcomes, but there is a need to model the "corner solution" outcomes or address the heterogeneity instead 6 .
The NOP and CNOP econometric frameworks are introduced in the next section (including their extended versions, the NOPC and CNOPC models, where the mechanisms determining the three decisions are dependent). Section 3 brie ‡y reports the results of Monte Carlo simulations to assess and compare the …nite sample performance of the OP, NOP(C) and CNOP(C) models, as well as the performance of the LR and Vuong tests and model selection criteria. In Section 4 the six alternative models -OP, multinomial probit, generalized OP, ZIOP, CNOP and CNOPC -are applied to explain policy interest rate decisions of the NBP, using a panel of the individual votes of the MPC members and real-time macroeconomic data available at policy meetings. Section 5 concludes. The Online Appendix contains three parts: Appendix A with the details of Monte Carlo design, Appendix B with the details of Monte Carlo results and Appendix C with supplemental output from empirical application.
The econometric framework
The CNOP model allows for any number of ordered discrete categories of the dependent variable greater than two, while the NOP model degenerates to the standard OP model in case of three outcome categories. For ease of exposition and without loss of generality, the observed dependent variable is assumed to take on a …nite number of discrete values j coded as f J; :::; 1; 0; 1; :::; Jg, and the in ‡ated neutral outcome is coded as zero 7 .
The proposed models are suitable for the large survey data, both cross-sectional and longitudinal, though a su¢ ciently long discrete-valued time series is also applicable. Since in this paper the models are applied to the panel data, the econometric framework is presented in the panel context using double subscript, where the index i denotes one of N crosssectional units and index t denotes one of T time periods. The application to the pure cross-sectional or time-series data is straightforward by setting N or T to one.
Each observation is treated as an independent draw from the population both along the cross-sectional and time-series dimensions. Thus, it is assumed that the cross-sectional units are independent, that the model speci…cation is dynamically complete, hence, there is no serial correlation among the latent errors 8 .
The cross-nested ordered probit (CNOP) model
Let r it = f 1; 0; 1g be a trichotomous latent variable that determines whether the individual policy stance is loose, neutral or tight, and let m it and m + it be the discrete nonpositive and nonnegative latent variables that set the magnitude of y it , conditional on r it = 1 and 6 For a debate between the sample selection and two part-models see Leung and Yu (1996) , Jones (2000) , Dow and Norton (2003) , Madden (2008) . 7 Of course, the in ‡ated outcome does not have to be in the very middle of ordered categories. If the in ‡ated outcome is at the end of the ordered scale, the three-part CNOP model reduces to the two-part ZIOP model. 8 The treatments of spatial e¤ects (that are quite reasonably expected in the panel with small N ) and serial autocorrelation of the disturbance terms are among the possible extentions of the model. For example, the CNOP model can be further extended by allowing for the serial correlation among the latent residuals and employing the dynamic OP speci…cations (Eichengreen, Watson and Grossman, 1985) of three latent equations, estimated via the Gibbs sampler.
r it = 1, respectively. Then assume that the observed vote for a change to policy rate y it is generated as
Notice that r it is observed only if y it 6 = 0, while m it and m + it are observed only if y it < 0 or y it > 0, respectively. Conditional on a set of explanatory variables, we will assume further that the mechanisms generating r it , m it and m + it are either independent or dependent.
The model assumes two stages and three regimes, and includes three OP latent equations. At the …rst stage (the upper level of the decision tree -see the top left panel of Figure  2 ) there is a continuous latent variable r it , representing the magnitude of the policymaker i's policy stance and set at a meeting t in response to the observed data according to a policy inclination equation
where x it is the t th row of an observed T i K data matrix X i , T i is the number of observations available for the individual i, is a K 1 vector of unknown coe¢ cients, and it is an error term, independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across i and t.
The regime-setting decision r it is coded as 1, 0, or 1, if the policymaker i's policy stance is loose, neutral or tight, respectively. The correspondence between r it and r it is given by the matching rule
where 1 < 1 2 < 1 are unknown threshold parameters to be estimated. Under the assumption that the disturbance term it is distributed with the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) F , the probabilities of each possible outcome of r it are:
At the second stage (the lower level of the decision tree) there are three regimes and two latent amount equations.
Regime r it = 1 (loose policy stance).
Conditional on being in regime r it = 1 the continuous latent variable m it , representing the desired change to the rate, is determined by the amount equation
where is a K 1 vector of unknown coe¢ cients, z it is the t th row of an observed T i K data matrix Z i , and " it is an i.i.d. error term with the c.d.f. F .
The discrete change to the rate m it is determined according to the rule-
where 1 = J 1 J ::: 1 0 = 1 are J unknown thresholds to be estimated.
The conditional probability of a particular outcome j is given by
which can be written more compactly, given that 1 = J 1 and 0 = 1, as
Regime r it = 0 (neutral policy stance).
Conditional on being in regime r it = 0 no further policy actions are taken -the rate remains unchanged:
Therefore, the conditional probability of a particular outcome j is given by Pr( y it = jjx it ; r it = 0) = 0 for j 6 = 0, 1 for j = 0.
Regime r it = 1 (tight policy stance).
Conditional on being in regime r it = 1 the continuous latent variable m + it , representing the desired change to the rate, is set by the other amount equation
where is a K 1 vector of unknown coe¢ cients, z + it is the t th row of an observed T i K data matrix Z :::
are J unknown thresholds to be estimated. The conditional probability of a particular outcome j is given by
Assuming that it , " it and " + it are independent, the full unconditional probabilities to observe the outcome j are given by combining the probabilities in (2), (4), (5) and (7):
where I j 0 is an indicator function such that I j 0 = 1 if j 0 and I j 0 = 0 otherwise (analogously for I j=0 and I j 0 ).
The proposed model, as any model with a latent variable, is not identi…ed without some (arbitrary) assumptions. Let us assume the standard normal form of the error distributions F , F and F + , and also that the intercept components of , and are all equal to zero 9 . However, the above probabilities are absolutely estimable functions, i.e. they are invariant to the identifying assumptions. These probabilities can be estimated by using the partial (pooled) ML estimator of the vector of parameters = ( 0 ; 0 ; 0 ; 0 ; +0 ; 0 ) 0 that solves
where q itj is an indicator function such that q itj = 1 if y it = j and 0 otherwise. All the parameters in all three equations are separately identi…ed (up to scale) through functional form. The typical panels contain data covering a short timespan for each individual. In this case, the asymptotic arguments rely on N tending to in…nity. With T …xed and N ! 1, this estimator is consistent and p N -asymptotically normal without any additional assumptions other than the standard identi…cation assumptions and regularity conditions (see Wooldridge 2010, pp. 489-490) . However, the usual asymptotic standard errors and test statistics obtained from pooled estimation are valid only under the assumption of no serial correlation among error terms it , " it and " + it . Without dynamic completeness, the standard errors must be adjusted for serial dependence, for example, by using a robust to density misspeci…cation sandwich estimator of asymptotic variance of
where s it ( b ) is the score vector and H it ( b ) is the expected Hessian (see Wooldridge 2010, pp. 490-493) . The asymptotic standard errors of b are the square roots of the diagonal elements of (10).
In the application to panel data with small N and relatively large T , we are basically in the realm of time-series analysis, and the asymptotic arguments rely on T tending towards in…nity, standard identi…cation and stationarity assumptions. Using either …xed T and N ! 1 or …xed N and T ! 1 asymptotics, the above pooled ML estimator in (9) is consistent and asymptotically normal even if the error terms are arbitrarily serially correlated, the dynamics are not correctly speci…ed, and X i , Z i and Z + i contain not strictly exogenous covariates, lags of covariates and lagged y it 10 .
The nested ordered probit (NOP) model
The only di¤erence between the NOP and CNOP models is that all three nests of the NOP model do not overlap, i.e. regimes r it = 1 and r it = 1 do not allow for a nochange response (see the top panels of Figure 2 ). Therefore, in the NOP model the full unconditional probabilities to observe an outcome j (again, assuming that the disturbance terms of three latent equations are independent) are given by
I j=0 Pr(r it = 0jx it )+ I j>0 Pr(r it = 1jx it ) Pr(w
where now 1 = :::
) unknown thresholds to be estimated at the lower level (instead of 2J in the CNOP model), and the other parameters and assumptions are analogous to those in the CNOP model.
To estimate the NOP model one can employ the ML estimator from (9), using the probabilities from (11). The log of the likelihood function of the NOP model, in contrast to that of the CNOP one, is separable with respect to the parameters in three latent equations. Thus, solving (9) is equivalent to maximizing separately the likelihoods of three OP models, corresponding to the above three latent equations (1), (3) and (6), where the data matrices Z + i and Z i are truncated to contain only the rows with y it > 0 and y it < 0, respectively. 1 0 This result is analogous to employing pooled OLS estimation in linear panel models.
Relaxing assumption of independent disturbances
The NOP and CNOP models can be further extended by relaxing the assumption that the error terms , " and " + are uncorrelated, and introducing the correlated versions of the models, NOPC and CNOPC ones. I now assume that ( ; " ) and ( ; " + ) follow the standardized bivariate normal distributions with the correlation coe¢ cients and + ; respectively. The full unconditional probabilities to observe an outcome j for the CNOPC model can be written now as
where F 2 ( 1 ; 2 ; ) is the c.d.f. of the standardized bivariate normal distribution with the correlation coe¢ cient between the two random variables 1 and 2 . The full unconditional probabilities to observe an outcome j for the NOPC model are given by
To estimate the CNOPC and NOPC models by ML, we have to solve (9), replacing the probabilities in (8) and (11) with those in (12) and (13), respectively, and re-de…ning the vector of parameters as = ( 0 ; 0 ; 0 ; 0 ; +0 ; 0 ; ; + ) 0 .
Partial e¤ects
The partial (or marginal) e¤ect (PE ) of each continuous covariate on the probability of each discrete choice is computed as the partial derivative with respect to this covariate, holding all the others …xed at their sample median values. For the discrete-valued covariates the PE is computed as the change in the probabilities, when this covariate changes by one increment and all the others are …xed. To facilitate the derivation of the PE s, the matrices of covariates and corresponding vectors of parameters can be partitioned as follows:
where W includes only the variables common for X, Z + and Z ; P includes only the variables common for both X and Z + , but which are not in Z ; M includes only the variables common for both X and Z , but not in Z + ; V includes only the variables common for both Z and Z + , but not in X; whereas e X, e Z + and e Z include only those unique variables that appear only in one of the latent equations.
A matrix of covariates X and the vectors of parameters for X can be written down as X = (W; P; M; e X; V; e Z + ; e Z ),
The partial e¤ects of the row vector x it on the overall probabilities in (12) can be now computed for the CNOPC model as
where f is the probability density function (p.d.f.) of the standard normal distribution F . The PE s for the NOPC model are given by replacing I j 0 with I j>0 and I j 0 with I j<0 . The PE s for the NOP and CNOP models are obtained as above by setting = + = 0. The asymptotic standard errors of the PE s are computed using the Delta method as the square roots of the diagonal elements of
Model comparison
The performance of competing models can be compared by using the model selection tests and informational criteria. The NOP and CNOP models are nested in the NOPC and CNOPC models, respectively, as their uncorrelated special cases. The NOP model is nested in the CNOP model. The latter becomes a NOP model with the same value of the likelihood function if 1 ! 1 and + 0 ! 1, and hence, Pr(y
+ it ; r it = 1) ! 0 and Pr(y it = 0jz it ; r it = 1) ! 0, which can be implemented by letting 1 and + 0 to be equal to the largest and smallest numbers available for the estimation software. Testing the NOP versus NOPC, NOP versus CNOP, NOP versus CNOPC, NOPC versus CNOPC, and CNOP versus CNOPC model can be performed with the likelihood ratio (LR) test.
The OP models is not nested in either of the two-level models, and vice versa. However, the OP model is not strictly non-nested with them. All …ve models overlap if all their slope coe¢ cients are restricted to being zero (i.e. if = 0; = 0; = 0; and the vector of slope parameters in the OP latent equation is also …xed to zero), and only the thresholds are estimated. Therefore, testing the OP versus any of the two-level models, as well as the NOPC versus CNOP model (which overlap if both reduce to the NOP model) can be conducted with a test for non-nested overlapping models, such as the Vuong test (due to Vuong 1989 ) that utilizes the statistical signi…cance between the di¤erence in the log likelihoods. The testing procedure is sequential. First, we need to verify that the two models are not equivalent, i.e. separately perform t-or F -tests to check whether the parameters of interest violate the overlapping constraints. Second, if the overlapping restrictions can be rejected, we have to conduct the Vuong test for strictly non-nested models. The null hypothesis of this test is that both models are misspeci…ed, but equally close to the unknown true d.g.p. The test statistic is very simple to compute: it is equal to the average di¤erence of the individual likelihoods divided by the estimated standard error of those individual di¤erences. Under the null hypothesis, the Vuong test statistic converges in distribution to a standard normal one. If the absolute value of the test statistic is less than the critical value, say 1.96, we cannot discriminate between the two models given the data. If the test statistic exceeds 1.96, we reject the equivalence in favor of one of the models; if the test statistic smaller than -1.96, we reject the equivalence in favor of the other.
The following model-selection information criteria are computed: AIC = 2l( ) + 2k,
, and HQIC = 2l( ) + 2ln(ln(N ))k, where k is the total number of the estimated parameters. The adjusted McFadden pseudo-R 2 measure of …t (given by 1 (l( ) k)=l 0 ( ), where l 0 ( ) is the value of the restricted likelihood function, maximized with all the slope parameters in …xed to zero) can also be used for the model selection, but its selection results are equivalent to those of the AIC, because the value of the l 0 ( ) is identical in all the above models. Another measure of …t, the Hit rate, is computed as the percentage of correct predictions, where the predicted discrete outcome is that with the highest estimated probability.
3 Finite sample performance I conducted massive Monte Carlo experiments to illustrate and compare the …nite sample performance of the ML estimators in the single-and three-equation models, namely to assess the bias and uncertainty of the estimates of parameters and partial e¤ects, as well as their asymptotic standard errors, the performance of the LR and Vuong tests and model selection criteria as discussed in the previous section, and the e¤ect of exclusion restrictions. The simulations were performed using GAUSS programming language (version 10) with CML module (version 2) for the constrained ML estimation. The details of Monte Carlo design and the results of these simulations are reported and discussed in Appendix A. Here I provide a brief summary of Monte Carlo design and main …ndings.
The observations in the repeated samples were drawn independently. This corresponds to either the cross-sectional model with uncorrelated units or to the time series model without serial dependence. Therefore, the results are applicable to assess the …nite-sample performance of the ML estimator with: (i) i.i.d. cross-sectional data and N ! 1 asymptotics; (ii) dynamically complete model for time-series data and T ! 1 asymptotics; (iii) i.i.d. panel data with …xed T and N ! 1 asymptotics; and (iv) dynamically complete model for panel data with …xed N and T ! 1 asymptotics 11 .
Five di¤erent d.g.p's were simulated: OP, NOP, NOPC, CNOP, and CNOPC. For each d.g.p., 3000 repeated samples with 250, 500 and 1000 observations were generated. Under each d.g.p. and for each sample size, several competing models were estimated, always including the OP and NOP models as the benchmarks. I found that: (i) it requires two to three times more observations for the three-part models to achieve the same accuracy of the estimated parameters as that of the OP model; (ii) each of the …ve models under its own d.g.p., not surprisingly, estimates the quantities of interest better than the other models; however, the three-part models under the true OP d.g.p. perform much better than the OP model under the NOP(C) and CNOP(C) d.g.p's; (iii) as the sample size increases, the performance of the three-part models under the OP d.g.p. improves drastically, whereas the performance of the OP model under the NOP(C) and CNOP(C) d.g.p's improves only slightly.
Under any three-part d.g.p, the Vuong tests tend to correctly favor the true model versus the OP model in almost 100% of replications, as sample size increases. However, under the OP d.g.p. the Vuong tests of the NOP and CNOP models versus the OP model fail to discriminate between the two models, and are never in favor of the true OP model. The LR tests of the NOP versus NOPC and the CNOP versus CNOPC model (when the true d.g.p. is correlated) both have an empirical size between 4 and 5 percent, very close to the nominal size of 5 percent. Regarding the information criteria, while the AIC and AICc under the OP, NOP and CNOP d.g.p's select the true model slightly less frequently than the BIC and cAIC, under the NOPC and CNOPC d.g.p's they clearly outperform the HQIC and especially the BIC and cAIC.
In addition, in order to assess the e¤ect of exclusion restrictions, three di¤erent scenarios of the overlap among the covariates in the speci…cations of three latent equations were simulated: "no overlap" (each covariate belongs only to one equation), "partial overlap" (each covariate belongs to two equations) and "complete overlap"(all three equations have the same set of covariates). I found that the more exclusion restrictions the more accurate the estimates of the PE s, and the fewer the problems with estimation. The simulation results suggest that the asymptotic estimator might not perform well without the exclusion restrictions, that is with the complete overlap among the covariates, in the small samples (fewer than 35 observations per parameter). In case of the NOPC and CNOPC models under the partial overlap scenario in the small samples there might be the problems with the convergence and invertibility of the Hessian.
4 An application to policy interest rate "It is highly desirable that policy practice be formalized to the maximum possible extent." The policy rate is a key determinant of the other short-term market interest rates, and of sharp interest for market participants: "What the market needs to know is the policy response function by which the central bank acts in a consistent way over time" (Poole, 2003) . Furthermore, "if practitioners in …nancial markets gain a better understanding of how policy is likely to respond to incoming information, asset prices and bond yields will tend to respond to economic data in ways that further the central bank's policy objectives" (Bernanke, 2007) . Another important reason to model policy rate is a search for better policy. In order to improve it, we have to obtain a clear empirical description of what is going to be improved. It is really hard to evaluate the monetary policy without describing it, using an econometric model.
In this section I let the real-world data speak, and apply the proposed and conventional OP models to explain the systematic components of policy interest rate decisions of the NBP, employing a panel of the individual votes of the MPC members and real-time macroeconomic data available at each MPC meeting during the 1998-2009 period 13 .
Data
Since the adoption of direct in ‡ation targeting in 1998 the NBP policy rate -the reference rate -may be undoubtedly treated as a principal instrument of Polish monetary policy 14 . The reference rate has been always set administratively by the MPC of the NBP, and is not an outcome of the interaction between the market supply and demand. The MPC consists of ten members and makes policy rate decisions once per month by means of formal voting. The Council members are appointed for a non-renewable term of six years, but the Chair may serve for two consecutive terms. The …rst term lasted from The MPC has always altered the levels of policy rates in discrete adjustments -the multiples of 25 basis points (bp) -made in the range from 25 to 250 bp. Table 2 shows the frequency distribution of the dependent variable -the individual MPC members'votes (reported in Tables 23, 24 and 25 of Appendix C) for the changes to the rate in the period 1998/04 -2009/12. To provide a reliable inference, the individual policy preferences are consolidated for analysis into three categories: increase, no change and decrease. At a monthly policy meeting, each member can express his or her preferred policy rate change, and can make a proposition to be voted on. If no proposition is made, there is no voting at all, and the rate remains unchanged; otherwise, the Chair selects the largest proposed move and the members vote on it. If the …rst voted proposition commands a majority, then the others are not voted on; otherwise, the members vote on the alternative proposal. As a matter of fact, the second voted proposal has always been passed. In case of two rounds of voting, the desired interest rate changes during the …rst round are used in estimations. The …rst two meetings (in February and March 1998) of the newly-established MPC are dropped from the sample to account for a transition to a new policy regime of in ‡ation targeting. The …rst meeting of the second MPC in February 2004 is also omitted. The policymakers have been absent from the meetings 15 times. Among the 1385 observations used in estimations, the policymakers preferred to leave the rate unchanged 889 times (in 64 percent of cases), as Table 2 reports.
The policy inclination decision is assumed to be driven by a direct response to new economic information, such as in ‡ation developments, the prospects for real economy, the spread between long-and short-term market interest rates, and recent change to the ECB policy rate. The amount decisions, …ne-tuning and smoothing the rate, are expected to be driven by the tactical institutional factors such as: (i) recent "policy bias" or "balance of risks" statements (addressing the policymakers' concerns about the competence and credibility of the central bank's communication); (ii) the dissent among the policymakers at the previous policy meeting (if dissenters preferred a lower policy rate, it creates a downward pressure to the rate at the current meeting, and, hence, the probability of rate cut increases); and (iii) the change to the rate, made by the MPC at the previous policy meeting (re ‡ecting the inertia of monetary policy and deliberate interest-rate smoothing behavior of the central bank).
The indicator of policy bias (bias t ) at the meeting t is de…ned as 1 if it is "easing", 0 if "neutral", and 1 if "restrictive". The measure of dissent among the policymakers is calculated as follows. Consider a committee with M members. For each member i and each policy meeting t de…ne the individual dissent indicator
where y it is the change to the reference rate preferred by member i, and nbpr t is the change made by the MPC. The measure of dissent at the meeting t (dissent t ) is then de…ned as the average of individual dissents across all MPC members: Table 26 of Appendix C reports for each MPC meeting the values of policy bias indicator (bias t ), overall dissent at the meeting (dissent t ), and policy rate decision of the Council ( nbpr t ). There was at least one dissenting member in 44 percent of MPC meetings. As Table 27 of Appendix C shows for each MPC member, the average values of individual dissents (d it ) across all meetings are between -0.232 and 0.400, i.e. the most "dovish" member (Zió÷ kowska) preferred a lower interest rate than the majority in 23.2% of meetings, while the most "hawkish" member (Filar) was in favor of a higher interest than the majority in 40% of meetings.
A dummy variable for the expected in ‡ation above the o¢ cial in ‡ation target (I(cpi e t > tar t )) is included into Z + only. The change to the rate at the last policy meeting ( nbpr t 1 ) is allowed to enter all three equations. The detailed de…nitions of all variables used in the study are given in Table 3 . The sample descriptive statistics is shown in Table 22 of Appendix C.
To account for the unobserved individual heterogeneity of policy preferences, I allow for intercept variation 16 . Slope heterogeneity is not of a concern, since our interest is in estimating the average e¤ects of explanatory variables. Under an assumption that the slope coe¢ cients di¤er randomly across individuals, the pooled estimator gives unbiased estimates of these average e¤ects. 
Variables in Z -and/or Z + only dissent Measure of dissent at an MPC meeting, defined by Eq. (15) (NBP).
bias Indicator of "policy bias" or "balance of risks" statements (available since 02/2000, set equal to zero before): -1 if "easing", 0 if "neutral", and 1 if "restrictive" (NBP).
I(cpi e >tar)
1 if cpi e > tar , and 0 otherwise; tar is the official inflation target; cpi e is the expected CPI over next 12 months, annual rate in percent (Ipsos-Demoskop survey of consumers and NBP).
I consider two alternative speci…cations of the CNOP(C) models. Both include the following common covariates: in X -cpi t , situation t , spread t , ecbr t , and nbpr t 1 ; in Z -nbpr t 1 , dissent t 1 , and bias t 1 ; and in Z + -nbpr t 1 , dissent t 1 , bias t 1 , and I(cpi e t > tar t ). In addition to the above, the …xed e¤ects (FE) speci…cation includes twenty dummy variables for individual MPC members, allowing each individual to have a di¤erent intercept in all three latent equations 17 . The FE speci…cation is an appropriate approach here, because we don't have a sample of individuals drawn randomly from a large population, but instead possess a full set of all twenty-one MPC members. Given that the cross-sectional dimension (N = 21) is small relative to the observed numbers of time periods (T i are about 67 on average, ranging from 36 to 76), we don't have the "incidental parameters problem"(see Neyman and Scott 1948, Lancaster 2000) . Nor should we expect any signi…cant …xed T asymptotic bias of our estimator with such a large temporal size 18 . An alternative speci…cation with dummies for hawkish and dovish members (the HD speci…cation) is more parsimonious, and includes only two dummy variables, I(h) it and I(d) it , de…ned for t 2 as 1 if the average individual dissent (from the …rst up to the previous MPC meeting) is, respectively, above 0.1 or below -0.1, and 0 -otherwise: The HD speci…cation, which includes only two instead of twenty dummies in each of the three latent equations, saves 54 degrees of freedom compared to the FE speci…cation. Thus, it can produce more e¢ cient estimates of the common slopes.
Estimation results
The following eight competing models were estimated by pooled ML, using the same set of explanatory variables (i.e. all the covariates in X, Z and Z + of the CNOP model): (i) the standard OP model; (ii) the OP model with random e¤ects (REOP); (iii) the generalized OP (GOP) model that relaxes the parallel regression assumption of the standard OP model, and that allows the slope coe¢ cients to di¤er by outcome category; (iv) the multinomial probit (MNP) model, simultaneously estimating binary probits for all possible comparisons (in our case two) among the outcome categories; (v) the two-equation ZIOP model that allows zero observations to come from two di¤erent processes; (vi) the ZIOP(a) model, which is identical to the ZIOP model, except that all the covariates in the participation equation are taken by their absolute values to take into account the binary (change versus no change) nature of the …rst-stage decision; and (vii-viii) the three-equation CNOP and CNOPC models with di¤erent sets of covariates in each equation 19 . To give the ZIOP and ZIOP(a) models better chances, all of the CNOP covariates are included into both parts, contrary to the three-part models. Table 4 reports the summary statistics from six alternative models with FE speci…cation and REOP model 20 . The two-and three-equation models demonstrate a sharp increase in the likelihood and hit rate compared to the single-equation ones. The CNOP model is superior to the others according to AIC and HQIC, while the ZIOP(a) model is favored by the BIC and AICc. However, all the Vuong tests of the CNOP model versus the ZIOP(a), ZIOP and OP models are in favor of the CNOP model at the 1 percent signi…cance level. The CNOPC model with heavily parameterized FE speci…cation has experienced problems with the invertibility of the Hessian (likely, due to the multicollinearity problems). The estimations of seven models with HD speci…cation are reported in Table 5 21 . The far more parsimonious HD speci…cation demonstrates a rather good …t, and is preferred over the FE speci…cation by BIC, AICc and HQIC for all the models, and by AIC for the CNOP and ZIOP(a) models. Again, the two-and three-equation models have far better …ts than the single-equation ones. The CNOP model is now overwhelmingly superior to all of the others (including now also the CNOPC model) according to all information criteria. The Vuong tests of the CNOP model versus the ZIOP and OP models are in favor of the CNOP model at the 1% signi…cance level, and versus the ZIOP(a) model at the 5% level. The CNOPC model exhibits insigni…cant increase in the likelihood according to the LR test (p-value is 0.65). The estimated correlation coe¢ cients and + (and their standard errors in parentheses) are -0.48(0.64) and 0.25(0.29), respectively.
The details for the speci…cations and estimated coe¢ cients of the OP, ZIOP, CNOP and CNOPC models are presented in Tables 28 and 29 of Appendix C for the FE speci…cation,  and Table 30 of Appendix C for the HD speci…cation. I only brie ‡y discuss the estimated coe¢ cients focusing instead on the marginal e¤ects of the explanatory variables on the choice probabilities. The policy inclination decisions of the CNOP(C) models indeed appear to be driven by reaction to the economic situation. All the coe¢ cients on the changes to in ‡ation ( cpi t ), expected economic situation (situation t ), interest rate spread (spread t ), and recent change to the ECB policy rate ( ecbr t ) are statistically signi…cant at the 1% level, and have the expected positive signs. The coe¢ cients on both policy bias (bias t 1 ) and dissent among the policymakers (dissent t 1 ) are both insigni…cant if included into X (p-values are larger than 0.2), but are signi…cant at the 1% level if included in Z (for both bias t 1 and dissent t 1 ) and Z + (for bias t 1 only) in the FE speci…cation of the CNOP model. In two equations of the ZIOP model, the coe¢ cients on both bias t 1 and dissent t 1 have the opposite signs. The coe¢ cient on the last change to the NBP policy rate ( nbpr t 1 ) is statistically signi…cant at the 1% level in all equations of the OP, ZIOP and CNOP(C) models. This variable represents the endogenous partial adjustment of policy rate, due to the intentional interest-rate smoothing and intrinsic gradualism of central bank behavior. We expect a positive coe¢ cient in a single-equation OP model; therefore, for example, in the case of a hike to the rate, the probability of a hike/cut at the next meeting should be larger/smaller, ceteris paribus, than in the case of a cut. However, the coe¢ cient on nbpr t 1 has a negative sign in the OP model. Using the OP models, one would conclude that the larger the hike to the rate at the last meeting, the more likely is a cut at the next meeting. Arguably, this nonsensical result is due to an assumption of the single-equation OP model that the e¤ect of a particular variable is homogenous.
In the CNOP(C) models we assume that the observed changes to the rate are the result of three distinct decisions, on which a given variable may have the opposite e¤ects. We expect a high level of persistency in the latent policy stance, because of the slow cyclical ‡uctuations of macroeconomic indicators that exogenously drive the policy stance. Moreover, the central bank is conservative and dislikes frequent reverses in the direction of interest rate changes. Therefore, we expect a positive coe¢ cient on nbpr t 1 in the inclination equation.
However, we expect the negative coe¢ cients in the amount equations for the same reasons of policy gradualism and inertia. The amount decisions are conditional on the policy stance, and are unidirectional: nonpositive or nonnegative, if the policy stance is loose or tight, respectively. The policymakers are cautious and tend to "wait and see", once they have moved the rate. Therefore, we expect a negative sign of the coe¢ cient on nbpr t 1 in the amount equations. As a matter of fact, while the rate changes are positively correlated during the whole sample (the …rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient is 0.22), they are actually negatively correlated during the tightening and easing sub-periods (the autocorrelation coe¢ cients are -0.22 and -0.05, respectively). Pr(Δy it = "decrease") Pr(Δy it = "no change") Pr(Δy it = "increase")
Notes: For de…nitions of variables see Table 3 . ***/**/* denote statistical signi…cance at 1/5/10 percent level, respectively. Robust to serial dependence asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Partial e¤ects of a given covariate are computed for the HD speci…cation holding the other covariates at their sample median values.
Indeed, the coe¢ cient on nbpr t 1 has a positive sign in the policy inclination equation, but the negative signs in the amount equations of the CNOP(C) models. It means that the rate hike/cut at the last meeting increases the probability of the tight/loose policy stance at the next meeting (compared to the cut/hike), but reduces the probability of the rate hike/cut conditional on the tight/loose policy regime. Obviously, the OP model fails to disentangle the opposite directions of the e¤ect of nbpr t 1 on the inclination and amount decisions. In the ZIOP model, this e¤ect has a positive sign in both equations -a nonsensical result. The ZIOP(a) model is able to produce more sensible results: the sign is positive in the participation equation, but negative in the amount equation.
The partial (marginal) e¤ects on the probabilities in the OP, ZIOP and CNOP models are compared in Table 6 . In contrast to the OP and CNOP models, the estimated e¤ects in the ZIOP model are mostly insigni…cant, and, if they are signi…cant, often have the opposite sign than those in the CNOP model. For example, results based on the ZIOP model suggest that a half percent month-over-month increase in the annual rate of in ‡ation -holding the rest of the explanatory variables at their sample median values -implies a 0.347 fall in the probability of no change to the rate at the next meeting. This contrasts with the OP and CNOP model results where we can conclude that it would actually lead to, respectively, a 0.077 and a 0.214 rise in the probability of no change. Table 3 . ***/**/* denote statistical signi…cance at 1/5/10 percent level, respectively. Robust to serial dependence asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Partial e¤ects of a given covariate are computed for the CNOP model with HD speci…cation holding the other covariates at their sample median values.
The key di¤erences are in the e¤ects of the recent change to the policy rate ( nbpr t 1 ). The OP and CNOP models have the opposite signs of the PE of nbpr t 1 on the probabilities of all three alternatives, and the ZIOP and CNOP models -on the probabilities of two choices. For example, the PE of nbpr t 1 on the probability of rate hike/cut is positive/negative in the CNOP model, but negative/positive in the OP model. Results, based upon the OP and ZIOP models, suggest that a 25 bp increase in the recent change to the policy rate results, respectively, in a 0.019 and a 0.19 fall in the probability of no change to the rate at the next meeting, holding the rest of the explanatory variables at their sample median values. However, basing our forecast on the CNOP model, we would conclude that it would actually lead to a 0.058 rise in the probability of no change at the next meeting. In contrast to the CNOP model, the PE s of nbpr t 1 in the OP and ZIOP models are not consistent with the observed gradualism of monetary policy decisions. The partial e¤ects on the unconditional probability of no change to the rate Pr( y it = 0) in the CNOP(C) models can be decomposed into three components -Pr( y it = 0jr it = 1), Pr( y it = 0jr it = 0) and Pr( y it = 0jr it = 1) -generated by the loose, neutral and tight policy regimes. For example, as Table 7 reports, the 0.43(0.08) PE of the change to in ‡ation cpi t on Pr( y it = 0) in the CNOP model is a combined result of three opposing components: the -0.16(0.03), 0.44(0.13) and 0.15(0.06) PE s in the loose, neutral and tight policy regimes, respectively. Or, the 0.058(0.016) PE of the recent change to the policy rate nbpr t 1 on Pr( y it = 0) is a sum of the -0.023(0.006), -0.090(0.060) and 0.171(0.050) PE s in the loose, neutral and tight policy stances, respectively 22 . Figure 3 contrasts the predicted probabilities from the OP and CNOP models for the range of nbpr t 1 and three possible values of policy bias at the previous MPC meeting (easing, neutral or restrictive), holding I(h) it and I(d) it at 1 and 0, respectively, and the rest of the explanatory variables at their sample median values. The predicted probabilities from the OP and CNOP models exhibit striking di¤erences. In the OP model, the probabilities of all three choices change monotonically through almost the entire range of nbpr t 1 : In contrast, the predicted probabilities in the CNOP model reveal non-monotonic patterns. For example, in the OP model under the easing policy bias Pr( y it = 0) monotonically decreases if nbpr t 1 increases, whereas in the CNOP model Pr( y it = 0) is decreasing if nbpr t 1 is less than 100 bp, but is increasing sharply otherwise and becoming closer and closer to one for values of nbpr t 1 greater than 0 bp. Clearly, such a non-monotonic relationship is overlooked in the marginal e¤ects from the OP model. The decomposition of Pr( y it = 0) into three components (the loose, neutral and tight zeros) is illustrated in Figure 4 for the range of nbpr t 1 and three values of bias t 1 . The graphs show, for example, that if the rate was increased at the last meeting by 25 bp and if the policy bias was easing, then Pr( y it = 0) is composed, on average, by 37% of the neutral zeros and 63% of the tight zeros. If the policy bias was neutral, then Pr( y it = 0) is composed of 46% of the neutral zeros and 54% of the tight zeros. If the policy bias was tight, then Pr( y it = 0) is composed of 84% of the neutral zeros and 16% of the tight zeros.
The classi…cation tables for the OP and CNOP models with both speci…cations are contrasted in Table 8 . Compared to the OP model, the CNOP model with both speci…cations demonstrates the drastic improvement in the correct predictions of cuts (from 49% in the OP to 79% in the CNOP model with FE speci…cations) and hikes to the rate (from 65% to 77%). The CNOP model predicts fewer zeros (876) than the OP model (980), but predicts more zeros correctly (767 or 86%) than the OP model (only 758 or 85%). The simple OP model, as typical, tends to over-predict the most observed outcome, i.e. no-change decision in our case. The "adjusted noise-to-signal ratio" is clearly lower in the CNOP than in the OP model for the cuts (9% versus 19%) and no-change outcomes (25% versus 52%), and is rather low (4%-5%) for the hikes in both models. Notes: A particular choice is predicted if its predicted probability exceeds the predicted probabilities of the alternatives. An "adjusted noise-to-signal ratio", introduced by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) , is de…ned as follows. Let A denote the event that the decision is predicted and occurred; let B denote the event that the decision is predicted but not occurred; let C denote the event that the decision is not predicted but occurred; let D denote the event that the decision is not predicted and not occurred. The desirable outcomes fall into categories A and D, while noisy ones fall into categories B and C. A perfect prediction would have no entries in B and C, while a noisy prediction would have many entries in B and C, but few in A and D. The "adjusted noise-to-signal" ratio is de…ned as [B /(B +D )]/[A/(A+C )].
The estimated predicted probabilities of three latent policy regimes, averaged across all MPC members, are shown for each policy meeting in Figure 5 of Appendix C together with the policy rate decisions made by the MPC. Averaged over entire sample, they are 0.51, 0.18 and 0.31 for the loose, neutral and tight policy stances, respectively, as Table 9 reports. These probabilities are also computed separately for the periods of policy easing, maintaining and tightening, as well as separately for the MPC decisions to change the rate or to leave it unchanged during the easing and tightening periods. The computations reveal that the average probability of the neutral policy stance during the maintaining periods is only 0.11. In spite of the 0.54 probability of the loose stance and 0.35 probability of the tight stance, the MPC maintained the rate for long periods between the rate reversals. The no-change decisions of the MPC during the easing periods were generated with the 0.52/0.43/0.05 probabilities of the loose/neutral/tight policy stance, while during the tightening periods these probabilities were 0.31/0.01/0.67, respectively. The MPC decisions to reduce the rate were generated with the 0.72/0.28/0.00 probabilities of the loose/neutral/tight policy stance. This closely mimics the observed 0.76/0.24/0.00 frequencies of the individual policy preferences to reduce/maintain the rate during the MPC decisions to cut it. The MPC decisions to increase the rate were generated with the 0.10/0.00/0.90 probabilities of the loose/neutral/tight policy stance. The observed frequencies of the individual policy preferences to reduce/maintain/increase the rate during the MPC decisions to hike it were 0.00/0.13/0.87, respectively, suggesting that the policy stances of the dissenters were actually loose during the MPC decisions to hike the rate. These …ndings are further con…rmed and re…ned in Table 10 , which reports the average predicted probabilities of individual policy stances separately for the individual policy decisions of MPC members to reduce, maintain or increase the rate. The average probability of the neutral policy stance during the individual no-change decisions is only 0.20. Table 10 also reports the decomposition of Pr( y it = 0) into three parts -Pr( y it = 0jr it = 1),Pr( y it = 0jr it = 0) and Pr( y it = 0jr it = 1) -corresponding to the "loose", "neutral" and "tight" zeros. The average predicted probability of no change during the observed no-change decisions is generated by the loose/neutral/tight policy regimes with the 0.48/0.25/0.27 probabilities, respectively. For the entire sample the average predicted probability of no change is decomposed as 0.46/0.28/0.26, respectively. The vast majority (about 75%) of observed zeros appeared to be generated by the tight or loose policy stances, o¤set by the amount decisions at the second stage. These …ndings suggest a high degree of the purposeful inertia in the policy-making process of the NBP: only a quarter (at most) of observed no-change decisions appears to be generated by neutral policy reaction to key macroeconomic indicators such as in ‡ation, real activity and ECB policy rate. The OP and ZIOP models have failed to detect this, and produced the biased estimates of the PE s of nbpr t 1 . Average predicted probabilities Decomposition of Pr(Δy it = 0) of individual policy stances "loose zeros"
"neutral zeros"
"tight zeros"
Notes: The predicted probabilities are from the CNOP model with HD speci…cation. Ordinal responses, when the decisionmakers face the choices to reduce, to leave unchanged or to increase (e.g., prices, consumption, ratings or policy interest rates) or when they must indicate the negative, neutral or positive attitudes or opinions, are often characterized by abundant observations in the middle neutral or zero category (no change or indi¤erent attitude). Such excessive "zeros"can be generated by di¤erent groups of population or by separate decision-making processes. Besides, the positive and negative outcomes can be driven by distinct sources too. In such situations, it would be a misspeci…cation to treat all the observations as coming from the same d.g.p., and to apply a standard singleequation model. This paper develops a more ‡exible cross-nested ordered probit model for such types of ordinal outcomes, combining three OP latent equations with di¤erent sets of covariates.
The proposed CNOP(C) models allow the separate mechanisms to determine what I call the inclination decision (y 0 versus y = 0 versus y 0, interpreted as a loose, neutral or tight policy stance) and two amount decisions, conditional on the loose or tight policy stance (the magnitude of y when it is nonpositive or nonnegative, respectively). The inclination decision is driven by the direct reaction to the changes in the macroeconomic environment, whereas the amount decisions allow policy stance to be o¤set by the tactical and institutional features of policymaking process. This three-regime approach is able to discriminate among the following three types of zeros: the "always" or "neutral" zeros, generated directly by the neutral policy reaction to the economic developments; and two kinds of "not-always" or "o¤set" zeros, the "loose" and "tight" zeros, generated by the loose or tight policy inclinations o¤set by the tactical reasons. The model also allows for the possible correlation among three latent decisions. The Monte Carlo results suggest good performance of the model in the small samples and demonstrate its superiority with respect to the conventional OP model, which produces biased estimates of the discrete-choice probabilities and of the marginal e¤ects of the covariates on those probabilities, if the underlying d.g.p. is heterogeneous. Although the proposed approach indeed tends to require larger sample sizes than the usual OP model, due to the heavier parameterization involved, the simulations suggest that the CNOP(C) models provide accurate and reliable inference even in small samples (about 200 observations) with a mixture of di¤erent d.g.p's.
The CNOP(C) models are applied to explain policy rate decisions of the National Bank of Poland, using the panel of the individual votes of the MPC members and real-time macroeconomic data available at the policy-making meetings. The voting preferences appeared to be well modelled by proposed two-step three-regime approach. The real-world data favor the CNOP model. Not only does it …t the data much better, but it also has some important advantages over the single-and two-equation models, such as the standard and generalized OP, multinomial probit and zero-in ‡ated OP models.
In particular, the CNOP(C) models are able to identify the driving factors of each decision. For example, the rate change, made at the previous MPC meeting, has the opposing impacts on the inclination and amount decisions. The conventional OP models are shown to confuse the marginal e¤ects of the explanatory variables that only have an impact on one decision or opposing impacts on two decisions. In addition, the proper estimation of the marginal e¤ects of the explanatory variables is shown to exhibit the presence of a non-monotonic relationship between these variables and outcome probabilities. It might have the important implications for the statistical inference, since the OP model fails to detect such non-monotonic patterns.
The CNOP(C) models are able to estimate the probabilities of three types of zeros and how this decomposition depends on the observed data. The vast majority (about 75%) of observed zeros appeared to be generated by the tight or loose policy stances, o¤set by the inertial amount decisions. These …ndings suggest a high degree of intentional interest-rate smoothing in the decision-making process of the NBP: only a quarter of observed no-change decisions appears to be explained by neutral policy reaction to economic conditions. It is quite plausible that the small changes to the rate can be also in ‡ated and characterized by two types of observations, coming either from the loose (tight) or neutral policy stance. By adding the third amount equation, conditional on the neutral policy regime, with three outcome categories (no change, small cut and small hike), the resulting four-part CNOP(C) models will allow for heterogeneity in the three middle categories.
